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ABSTRACT
This artic'le examines  the costs  of U.S,  oil  conservation  pol  icy by using
parameters  fron five world oil  models  used  in a recent Energy  Modeling  Forun
study.  Variation  in the estimated  cost  of U.S.  conservation  across  the nodels
suggests  that taxing oil  consumption  l',ould  better serve  economic  efficjency
than  government  controls  on  oil  consumption  levels.  Furthermore,  the analysis
shows  that uni.lateral  U.S.  conservation  lowers  the world  ojl  prjce and
stimulates  non-U.S.  oil  consumption.  When  this effect is taken  into account,
the estjmated  cost of achieving  a given  level of world  oil  conservatjon
through  unilateral U.S.  action  can  be  substantially  greater  than  the cost of
achieving  the same  level of U.5.  oil  conservation.
I.  II{TRODUCTION
In recent  years, increasing  attention  to 91oba1  envjronmental  problems,
energy  security, and  declining  u.S. oil  productjon  have  revjved  calls for
energy  conservation. The  benefits and  costs of energy  conservation  remain
controversial  .  Hall (1990,  1992)  has  provided  comprehensive  estimates  of the
externality costs associated  vlith energy  consumption.  0thers, such  as Brown
and  Phillips (1991),  Chandler,  et. al  . (1988)  and  the National  Academy  of
Sciences  (1991),  have  provided  estimates.of  the costs  of conservation.
Previous  cost studjes  have  tended  t0 assess  the costs  of holding  U.S.  oil
consumption  at a predetermined  level and/or  relied upon  a single supply  curve
of conservation. Cost  estimates  such  as these  are greatly affected by the
projected  growth  of oil  consumption,  as  we1  I as jndividual  model  parameters.
A more  general  approach  is to use  a number  of world oii  models  to est'imate
supply  curves  of ojl  conservation,  Using  differing models,  v',ith  varying2
parameters,  provides  a richer set of assumptions  with which  the cost of
conservation  can  be assessed.  Varying  supply  estimates  permits  an assessment
of the extent of uncertainty  about  the cost of conservation  and  is  helpful in
deternining  whether  specific conservation  mandates  can  serve  economic
effi ci  ency.
liith increasing  attentjon  to 91oba1  environmental  issues,  policymakers  in
the United  States  may  be concerned  about  the net effects of domestic  ojl
conservation  policies on  global  oil  conservation.  As  the United  States
reduces  its oil  consumption,  it  reduces  world  oil  prices  and  triggers
offsetting gains in world oil  consumption.  These  effects can  be incorporated
in estimated  supply  curves  of world  oii  conservation  achieved  through
uni  lateral U.S.  pol  icy.  Such  supply  curves  can  be  useful  in determining  an
efficient level of conservation  policy  when  the perceived  benefits  are
primarily  gl  obal  .1
To estinate supply  curves  of oil  conservation  for the United  States, we
used  a three-step  process. First, we  obtained  projected  prices  and
quantities, as  well as price elasticities of supply  and  demand  from  five world
oil  market  models  that part'icjpated  in the eleventh  Energy  Modeling  Forum
study, International 0il  Suoolies  and  Dernands.  |Je  then used  parameters  from
each  nodel  in simu'lation  analysis  to estimate  how  U.S.  oil  conservation  would
affect prices and  quantities on the world  oil  market  under  a variety of
assumptions.  Finally, we  combined  welfare  analysis  with our sirnulation
results and  the model  parameters  to derjve supply  curves  of conservation  for
each  of the five models.
II.  A]{ALYTICAI  FRAI'IE}IORK
lle use  welfare  analysis  as a basis  to provide  estimates  of the marginal3
cost of oil  conservatjon. The  welfare-theoretic  approach  has  the advantages
of being  wel  1 grounded  in economic  theory  and  relatively  straight forward  to
implement  and  interpret.  Assessed  at different quantities  of conservation,
estimates  of marginal  cost can  be combined  to provide  an estimated  supply
curve  of oil  conservation.
A.  The  Cost  of U.S.  Conservation
Hall (1990,  1992)  provides  comprehensive  estimates  of the externalities
associated  with energy  consumption.  If  the reduction  of externalities is
regarded  as the socjal benefit  of oil  conservation,  then  the cost of U.S.
conservation  can  be  regarded  as  the welfare  lost (exclusive  of externalities)
by reducing  U.S.  oil  consumption  below  its free market  quantity.2 Under  this
definition of cost, the nrarginal  cost  of conservation  is the loss in U.S,
welfare  that results from  a marginal  reduction  in consumption.  This
relationship  can  be  expressed  as:
MC,=Po-t.fto, (l)
In the above  equation  MC.  denotes  the marginal  cost of conservation,  Po  the
U.S.  price of oil,  P,  the world  price  of oil,  Q.  the quantity  of u.S. oil
conservation,  and  Q"  the quantity  of U.S.  oil  imports. (A  derivation  of
equation  1 is provided  in the appendix.)
If  the United  States  is concerned  only  with domestic  conservatjon,
equation  l  can  be  used  to provjde  estimates  of the cost  of conservation,  The
narginal cost of conservation  is equal  to the difference between  the market's
valuation  of addjtional  oil  consumption,  Po,  and  the world  price of oil,  P*
p1  us the amount  by  which  a marginal  increase  in U.S.  oil  conservation  alters4
the cost of U.S.  oil  imports,  (AP,/AQ.).QH.  If U.S.  oil  conservatjon  has  no
effect on  world  oil  prices, then  the marginal  cost  of conservation  is sinrply
the difference  between  the U.S.  market's  margjnal  valuation  of oi1 consunption
and  the world  price of oil.
Theoretically,  U,S.  conservation  can  have  a negative  or positive  effect
on  the world  oil  price and,  therefore,  on  the U.S.  oil  .import  bi11.  Because
the United  States  is a large  consuner  of oil,  its conservation  puts  downward
pressure  on  world  oil  prices,  Some  conservation  measures  also  would  make  U.S.
oil  demand  more  inelastic, which  would  give a well-functioning  OPEC  cartel an
jncentive  to raise prices.  Because  many  conservation  measures  would  have  only
moderate  effects on  the elasticity of U.S.  oil demand  and  Griffin  (1985)  and
Dahl  and  Yilcel (1991)  have  shown  OPEC  to be less than a perfect cartel  , U.S.
conservation  efforts  generally  can  be  expected  to reduce  world oil  prices and,
consequently,  the U.S.  oil  import  bil1.
B,  The  GIobal  Effects of Unilateral Conservation
In theory,  U.S.  oil  conservation  can  lead  to changes  in oi1 consumption
jn the rest of the world that range  from  enhancing  to completely  offsetting
U.S.  conservation  po1  icy.3  In practice,  U.S.  conservation  actions  are likely
to be partial ly offset by increased  oil  consumption  jn the rest of the world.
As  U.S.  oil  conservation  reduces  the  world  ojl  price, it  induces  an  increase
in oil  consumption  outside  the Unjted  States, The  net effect js that the
change  in trorld  oil  conservation  is sonewhat  less  than  the change  in U.S.  oil
conservation  that results from  a unilateral  po1  icy.
Combining  these  factors, the net effect of U.S.  actions  on  world  oil
conservation  can  be expressed  as follows:0QcH
dQc
E
-  dQo*.  dP*
dPn  dQs
(2)
In the above  equation,  Q* denotes  world  oil  conservation  and  Qox  the quantity
of oil consumption  outside  the  United  States, (A  more  thorough  examination  of
the  relationships  between  U.S.  conservation,  world  oi1 prices,  and  net  wor1d
conservation  is provided  in the  appendix,)
C.  The  Marqinal  Cost  of Unilateral  Conservation
If  analysts are concerned  vlith the 91oba1  effects of a unilateral  oil
conservation  pol  icy,  equation  l  could  provide  an inadequate  measure  of the
cost.  lihen  U.S.  oil  conservation  stimulates  oil  consumption  outside  the
United  States,  the narginal  cost  of achievjng  world  conservation  through
unilateral pol  icy will  be  somewhat  higher  than  the marginal  cost of U.S.
conservati  on  .
Equations  l  and  2 can  be combined  to derive an expression  for the
marginal  U.S.  cost of achieving  world  oil  conservation  through  unilateral
pol  icy.  Specifically, dividing  l'lC,  (the  marginal  cost of U.S.  conservation)
by dQcr.,/dQc  (the change  in net world oil  conservation  with respect  to a change
in U.5. oil  conservation)  yields:
(3)
In the above  equation,  MC.,  denotes  the rnarginal  cost to the United  States  of
achieving  world  oil  conservation  through  its unilateral efforts.
As  equation  3 shows,  the effects  that U.S.  oil  conservation  has  on  the6
cost of U.S.  oil  imports  and  on  foreign  oi1 consumption  are  related  through
the world  oil  price.  As  u.S. conservation  lowers  the world  oil  pnice, it
reduces  the cost of U.S.  oi1 imports  and  brings  about  an increase  in oil
consumption  outside  the Unjted  States.  lf  U.S.  conservation  has  no  effect on
the world  oil  price (aP$/aQc  = 0), both  the cost  of U.S.  oil  imports  and
foreign  oil  consumption  will  remain  unchanged.
III.  E]'IF  STUDY  PROVIDES  PARAI'IETERS  FOR  ANALYSIS
Five models  of the world oil  market  used  in the eleventh  Energy  ltlodel  ing
Forum  (EMF)  study provide  the parameters  t,le  use  in our analysis of the costs
of oil  conservation, From  each  model  , we  obtained  a set of projected  world
oil  prices  and  quantities,  as  welI as jnferred  elasticities of supply  and
demand  for  use in our analysis.  The  use  of parameters  from  a number  of models
provides  a richer set of assumptions  from  which  the cost of unilateral oil
conservation  can  be as  ses  sed.
A.  The  lilodel  s
The  eleventh  EMF  study,  International  0il  Suoolies  and  Demands,  focused
on the supply  and  demand  trends  over the 1988-2010  period for various
scenarios  and  their impl  ication for the world's  dependence  upon  Persian  Gulf
oil.  For  the EMF  study,  proprietors  of 1l economic  models  of the world  oil
market  simulated  l2 different scenarios  wjth standardized  input assumptions,
An EMF  working  group  comprised  of leading  analysts  and  decision-makers  from
business,  government,  and  academia  analyzed  and  compared  these  results,
emphasizing  the reasons  for and  implications  of the observed  differences among
model  s  .
The  analysis  here  is restricted  to the five models  shown  in Table  1.  0f
the Il  models  included  in the EltlF  study, two  did not report results for the7
cartel  case, a market-clearing  scenario  used  t0 represent  basel  jne conditions
here,  Two  other  models  did not report  U.S.  oil  consumption  separately. A
fjfth  model  did not project  beyond  the  year  2000. And  fina'I1y,  the Gately
model  was  excluded  because  a reliable estimate  of the price elasticity of U.S.
oil  demand  for  the rnodel  could  not be obtained  for the range  of prices
required  by the analysis  here." A comparison  of all  tl  models  suggests  that
the five models  we  use  represent  well the range  of models  that participated in
the EMF  study.
Kress,  et. al  , (1992)  descrjbe  each  model  ,s structure  and  key  variables.
Key  input variables  for deterrnining  oi1 consumption  in the models  include:
the crude  oil  price and  GDP  (all  model  s),  and  a time trend for  autonomous
improvements  in oil  efficiency, unrelated  to price (0MS  and  DFI  only),  The
demand  functions for H0llS  and  FRB-Dallas  are econometrically  determined;  those
for OMS,  DFI, and  CERI  are based  upon  judgmenta'l  parameters,  which  for  some
models  are based  partly upon  available  energy  demand  studies.
Regional  disaggregation  outside  the United  States  varies  across  models,
FRB-Dallas  specifies  individual  demand  equations  for the major  seven  0ECD
countries (United  States, Canada,  Japan,  l,lest  Gerrnany,  France,  United  Kingdom,
and  Italy).  The  remaining  models  aggregate  the European  countries  into one
region.  0n  the supply  side, CERI  disaggregates  non-OPEC  production  into 16
major  regions,  while  the others  usuai  ly distinguish  only  the United  States
from  other non-OPEC  regions.
B,  Basel  i ne Pro.i  ect  i  ons
For  each  of the five models,  vte  obtained  a baseline  projection  of prices
and  quantities for our analysis  from  a cartel scenarjo  for which  each  modeler
reported  results.  In the cartel scenarjo,  OPEC  was  assumed  to oDerate  as acartel  and  world econonic  growth  t{as
determined  the market-clearing  worl  d
through  the interaction of regional
behavi  or.
C.  Demand  and  Suoolv  Elasticities
B
assumed  to be 2.9%  per year.  Each  model
oil  price and  quantities  endogenously
demands,  supplies,  and  0PEC  price-setting
In the El,lF  study,  results  from  the  models  were  compared  for a variety of
scenarios,  representing  different  exogenous  oi1  price  trajectories,  economic
growth  paths,  energy-saving  technical  progress,  and  oil-producing  cartel
behavior. For  the analysis  here,  results  from  two  model  runs  are used  to
infer estimates  of price  elasticities  of regional  supply  and  demand,
Table  2 reports  key  elasticities that we  have  inferred  from  the supply
and  demand  projections  that the  modelers  reported  for two  scenarios  for which
oil prices  were  specified  exogenously.  In one  scenario,  the  world  oi1 price
is assumed  to remain  flat  at $18  per barrel  .5  In the other  scenario,  the
world  oil price  rises  steadily  from  $18  per  bamel  until it  reaches  a plateau
of $36  per  barrel  in 2000,  at which  the  price  is rnaintained  through  2010.
Both  cases  assume  that the  market  economies  grow  by 2.9 percent  per annum  and
the U,S,  economy  grows  by 2.6 percent  per annum.  Because  GDP  is the same  in
both  cases,  the resulting  responses  are  representative  of pure  price
elasticities.
There  are  limitations  to inferring  a model's  price  elasticities  from  two
scenarios  (Huntington,  1992).  Nevertheless,  a more  thorough  analysis  of how
the EMF  models  represent  0ECD  demand  (Huntington,  1993)  indicates  that the
price  elasticities  we  have  'inferred  from  the  flat and  rising price  scenarios
are  generally  consistent  with econometric  response  surfaces  estimated  from  the
results  of all  l2 scenarios,  as  well  as  those  reported  by  the  modelers9
thensel  ves  ,
D.  0PEC  Suoolv
Four  of the models  (OMS,  CERI,  HOMS  and  FRB-Da1  las) represent  0PEC
pnice  setting with price-redction  functions. The  fifth  model  , DFI,  represents
0PEC  price setting  with dynarnic  optirnization,  Although  the l2 EMF  scenarios
contained  two  0PEC  cartel cases--the  base  case  used  here  and  a high demand
case--a  conparison  of these  two  scenarios  did not reveal how  the models  would
behave  when  U.S.  pol  icy is used  to reduce  oil demand.
Our  analysis is  based  on three cases  of 0PEC  supply  for each  model  .  Two
cases  rely on limiting assumptions.  In one  case,  0PEC  acts  to hold  price
constant--that  is, 0PEC  supply  is perfectly  elastic.  In the other  case,  0PEC
holds  its  production  constant--that  is, OPEC  supply  is perfectly inelastic.  A
thjrd case  rel  ies on  an  the intermediate  assumption  that OPEC  supply  is
unitary elastic.  Although  uniform  assunptions  about  OPEC  supply  reduce  the
potential  variation in cost  estimates  across  models,  the remaining  variation
'i  s i  nstructi  ve  .
Furthermore,  our examination  of the DFI, O|'|S  and  FRB-Dallas  models
indicates  that a unitary  0PEC  supply  elasticity may  be  a reasonable
approximation  for the nodels, Analysis  of the DFI  model  indicated  a supply
elasticity somewhat  less than  unity  when  0PEC  js pushed  to expand  its capacity
substantially. A greater  elasticity might  be indicated  when  0PEC  is not
pushed  to expand  its capacity  substantially--as  would  be  the case  when  U,S,
po1  icy reduces  wor'ld  oil  demand.
Direct analysis  of the price-reaction  functions  in the OMS  and  FRB-Dallas
models  revealed  re1  atively low  supply  elasticit'ies  when  capacity  is taken  as
given,  but informal  discussion  with several  modelers  'indicate  that OPECIO
capacity figures are often adjusted  on a.judgmental  basis  when  a scenario
yields projected  oil  prices  that are  too high  or low.  Such  adjustments
increase  the elasticity of 0PEC  supply.
IV.  THE  COST  OF  COilSERVATIOI{
l,le  used  parameters  from  each  of the five rnodels  described  above  in a
series  of simulation  analyses  to provide  multiple  estinates  of the effects of
U.S.  oil  conservation  on  prices  and  quantities  on  the world  ojl  market, llle
then used  equations  I  and  3 to estimate  supply  (marginal  cost) curves  of
conservation  for  each  of the five nodels  under  three assumptions  about  0pEC
behavior, The  three  cases  for 0PEC  supply  include: one  in which  OPEC  adjusts
its output  such  that the world  price of oil  is unchanged,  one  in which  OpEC
has  a unitary elasticity of supply,  and  one  in which  OpEC  production  is
unchanged.
A.  If  the World  Oil Price  Doesn,t  Chanqe
Figure  I plots supply  (marginal  cost) curves  of U.S.  conservation  for the
year 2010  for each  model  under  the assumption  that 0pEC  adjusts its  production
to keep  the world  price of oil  unchanged,6  If  the world  price of oil  does
not change,  the marginal  cost  of U,S.  conservation  at any  given  level of
conservation  is the price increase  (impl  ied tax on  U.S.  oil  consumption)
required  to achieve  that level of conservatjon.  As  Figure  I shows,  the
marginal  cost estjmated  for each  model  rjses as the amount  of U.S.
conservation  i  ncreases  .7
l.larginal  costs  rise nore  steeply  for models  in which  U.S.  oil
consumption  is less responsive  to price (AQD/apD  is less negative). (The
responsiveness  of consumption  to price is a d.irect  function  of the ratio of
price to consumption  in the carte.l  case,  as  wel  l as  the price elasticity ofll
demand.)  DFI  has  the most  steeply  sloped  conservation  curve  because  U.S.  oil
consumption  is least sensitive  to price jn this model  .  CERI  and  FRB-Dallas
have  the least steeply  sloped  curves  because  they  represent  U.5. ojl
consumption  as more  sensitive to price.  OMS  and  HOMS  fall  between  these  other
est  i  nates  .
As Figure  I shows,  setting  quantity  targets  for U.S.  oil  conservation
pol  icy yields widely  varied  narginal  cost  estimates  across  the models.
Results  from  all  of the models  indicate  that the fjrst  million barrels  per  day
of oil  conservation  can  be had  for a margina'l  cost of less than $10  per
banel .  For the H014S,  OMS  and  DFI  models,  the marginal  cost of conservation
rises above  $20  per barrel before  oil  conservation  reaches  two  million barrels
per day.  At two  million bamels  per  day,  the CERI  and  FRB-Dallas  models  still
show  the marginal  cost of conservation  below  $10  per barrel  ,  For the CERI  and
FRB-Dallas  models,  the marginal  cost  of conservation  rises above  $20  per
barrel after  oil  conservation  reaches  four million bamels per day.  At four
million barrels  per day,  the H0MS,  OMS  and  DFI  models  all  indicate  a marg,inal
cost of oil  conservation  over  $50  ner barrel  .
A conservation  pol  icy that sets targets for U.S. oil  consumption  based  on
historical use  also  yields widely  varied  estirnates  of marginal  cost across  the
models. For  each  model  , Table  3 shows  the rnarginal  cost of holding  U.S.  oil
consunption  in the  year  2010  to the level established  in 1988. Estimates
range  fron lows  of near  $13  per barrel with the CERI  and  OMS  models  to highs
near  $30  with the H0]llS  and  FRB-Dallas  models,
For each  model  , Table  3 also compares  assumed  1988  U.S. oil  consumption
with that projected  for the year  2010. The  difference  indicates  how  much  oil
conservat'ion  the United  States  would  have  to achieve  to keep  its oilt2
consumption  from  growing  over  the 22 year  period from  1988  to 2010,  according
to each  model  .
In developing  the cost  estimates,  differences  in the projected  quantities
of oil  consurnption,  as  vlell as  the responsiveness  of consumpti0n  to changes  in
price contribute  to the differences  in cost  estimates  across  the models.
Although  the FRB-Dal  las and  CERI  models  evidence  a similar responsiveness  in
U.S.  consumption  to changes  in price, the models  provide  the opposite  ends  of
the cost estimates,  because  the FRB-Dallas  model  projected  much  higher
consumption  for  the year 2010  than  the CERI  rnodel  .  Similarly, H0MS  shows  a
higher marginal  cost than  OMS  because  HOll|S  projected  rnuch  higher consumption
for the year  2010  than  OMS.  The  OMS  and  CERI  models  provide  similar marginal
cost estinates  because  the lower  projection  for U.S.  consumption  with the OMS
model  offsets the fact that it  shows  U.S.  oil  consumption  as less sensitive  to
price than  the CERI  nodel  .
B.  lf  0PEC  Supply  Elasticitv is Unitarv
Under  the assumption  that 0PEC  has  a unitary  supply  elasticity,  al1 of
the models  show  that u.S. oil  conservation  reduces  the world  oil  price,  All
of the models  also show  that a lower  world  oil  price stimulates  non-u.S.  oil
consumption.  The  effects of U.S.  conservation  on  the world  oi1 price and  non-
U.S.  oil  consumption  alters our estimates  of the marginal  costs  of oil
conservati  on.
The  estimated  reductions  in the  world  ojl  price and  gains  in non-U.S.  oil
consumption  vary across  the models. At one  extreme,  the DFI  model  shows  non-
U.S.  oil  consumption  increasing  by  about  20  percent  for each  barrel of oil
that the United  States  conserves. At the other extreme,  the CERI  and  FRB-
Dallas  models  s  hor,',  non-U.S.  oil  consumption  increasing  by about  30 percent  forl3
each  barrel of oil  that the United  States  conserves. The  OMS  and  H0MS  models
show  non-U.5,  oil  consumption  increasing  by about  25 percent  for each  barrel
of oil  that the united  States  conserves.
Figure  2 shows  three supply  curves  of conservation  for the OMS  model  for
the year 2010, One  of the curves  represent  the marginal  cost of conservation
when  the world  oil  price does  not change--that  is by how  much  the oil  price
paid  by U.S.  consumers  must  rise to achieve  given  levels of conservation.  The
other two curves  represent  the marginal  cost of U.S. oil  conservation  and
marginal  cost of achieving  world  conservation  through  unilateral U.S.  actjons
when  OPEC  has  a unitary  supply  el  asticity.
As  Figure  2 shows,  a unitary  OPEC  supply  elasticity alters the margina'l
cost of U.S.  conservation  from  the scenario  in which  it  is assumed  that U.S.
oil  consumption  has  no  effect on  the world  oil  price.  With  a un'itary  0PEC
supply  elasticity,  the marginal  cost  of conservation  is negative  at zero
conservatjon  because  increasing  conservation  from  this point  will  lower  the
price paid for oil  imports, The  marginal  cost  curve  is also steeper  with a
unitary  OPEC  supply  elasticity because  the difference  between  the impl  ied U.S.
consumption  price (Po)  and  the world oil  price (pr) grows  faster than po  as
conservation  is increased  and  the value  of reducing  the price of oi1 inports
falls  as conservation  reduces  U.S,  oil  imports.
The  unitary  0PEC  supply  e1  asticity drastically steepens  the supply  curve
of world  oil  conservation  achieved  through  unilateral U.S.  actions.  llljth  U.S.
conservatjon  stimulating  non-U.S.  oil  consumption,  a one-unit  gain in world
conservation  through  unilateral U.S.  action  requires  more  than  a one-unit  gain
in U.  S. conservation.
As  Figure  3 shows,  the models provide  varying  estimates  of the supplyI4
curve  of U.S. conservation  for the year 2010,  even  t.'rjth  the common  assumption
that OPEC  has  a unitary  supply  elasticity.  Results  from  all  of the models
indicate  the first  million bamels  per  day  of oil  conservation  can  be  had  for
a marginal  cost of less than  $4  per  barrel  .  The  FRB-Dalias  and  CERI  models
show  negative  marginal  costs  at one  million barrels  per  day.  For  the H0MS,
OMS  and  DFI  models,  the marginal  cost of conservation  rises to about  915  per
bamel around  two  million bamels  per  day. At two  million barrels  per  day,
FRB-Dallas  model  still  shows  a negative  marginal  cost and  the CERI  model  shows
a marginal  cost below  $4  per bamel.  For  the CERI  and  FRB-Dallas  models,  the
marginal  cost of conservation  rises to $15  per barrel  when  oil  conservation
reaches  about  four million barrels  per  day.  At four million bamels  per  day,
the HOMS,  OHS  and  DFI  models  all  indicate a marqinal  cost of oil  conservation
over $50  per barrel  .
As Figure  4 shows,  the rnodel  s a1  so provide  varying  estimates  of the
supply  curve  of world  conservation  achieved  through  unilateral U,S,  actions.
Results  from  all  of the models  indicate  the first  million bamels  per day  of
oil  conservation  can  be had  for a marginal  cost of less than $9 per barrel  .
The  FRB-Dallas  model  shows  negative  marginal  costs  at one  million bamels  per
day,  For the H0l4S,  OMS  and  DFI  models,  the marginal  cost of conservation
rises to about  $30  per bamel around  tlvo  million barrels per day.  At two
million barrels  per  day,  the CERI  and  FRB-Dallas  rnodels  still  show  marginal
cost at or below  $12  per barrel  .  For  the CERI  and  FRB-Dallas  models,  the
marginal  cost of conservation  rises to $30  per barrei when  oil  conservation
reaches  about  four million barrels  per  day.  At four  million barrels  per day,
the H0MS,  0lt1S  and  DFI  models  all  indicate a maroinal  cost of oil  conservation
over $90  per barrel  ,15
C.  If  0PEC  Production  Doesn't  Chanqe
Under  the assumption  that OPEC  production  does  not change,  all  of the
models  show  that U,S.  oil  conservation  reduces  the wor'ld  oi1 price more  than
they  did under  the assumptidn  that 0PEC  has  a unitary  supply  elasticity.  All
of the models  also show  that the lower  world  oil  price further stimulates  non-
U.S,  oil  consumption.  If 0PEC  does  not adjust  its production  to reduced  U.S,
oil  consumption,  any  given  change  in U.S.  consumption  requires  a greater
reduction  in non-0PEC  supply  and  a greater  increase  in non-U.S,  consumption  to
reestablish  market  clearing  condjtions, The  adjustment  requires  a greater
price reduction  than  would  be  needed  if  OpEC  adjusts  its production.
The  intensjfied  effects of U,S.  conservation  on  the world  oil  price and
non-U.S.  oil  consumption  alters the estimates  of the marginal  costs  of ojl
conservatjon. As Figure  5 shows  for the OMS  model  , the greater ability  of
U,S.  conservation  to reduce  the  world  oil  price  means  a lower  marginal  cost of
U,S.  oil  conservation  at sufficiently low  quantities  of U.S.  oil  conservation.
In this regard,  all  of the models  show  results similar to that obtained  from
the 0llS  model  ,  The  models  show  lower  narginal costs because  U,S. conservation
h,as  a greater impact  jn reducing  u.S. import  costs  when  it  more  sharply
reduces  world  oil  Drices.
A perfectly inelastic 0PEC  supply  also  makes  the estimated  supply  curves
of U.S.  conservation  steeper, Under  this elasticity assumption,  the
difference  between  the impl  ied U.S.  consumption  price (Po)  and  the world  oil
pnice  (Pu)  increases  more  sharply  as  conservatjon  is increased, In addition,
the value  of reducing  the cost  of oi1 imports  falls more  sharply  under  this
el  astjcity assunpti  on.
At sufficiently high  quantities  of conservat.i  on  -  -  about  four million tol6
five million bamels  per  day--al1  of the models  show  about  the same  marginal
costs  for U.S.  conservation  that they  do  rlith a unitary  0pEC  supply
elasticity.  At four m'illion  barrels  per  day,  the OMS  model  actually shows
slightly higher  marginal  costs  undef  the assumption  that 0pEC  does  not adjust
its production. At high  enough  conservation  Ievels--nore  than  six rnillion
barrels per day--the other four models  show  higher  marginal  costs of
conservation  under  the assumption  that opEC  supply  is perfecily inelastic.
The  offsetting increases  in non-U.S.  oil  consunption  that result from
U.S.  conservation  are  considerable  if  0PEC  supply  is perfectly inelastic.
Estimates  range  from  a 4S-percent  offset (H0lr1S)  to about  an  8S-percent  offset
(CERI)  for  every  banel  of oil  that the United  States  conserves. The  OMS,
FRB-Dallas  and  DFI  models  show  non-U.S,  oil  consurnption  increasing  by 50  to 70
percent  for  each  barrel of oil  that the United  States  conserves.
As Figure  5 shows  for the OHS  model  , the s.ize  of the offsetting gains in
non-U.S.  oi1 consumption  that result from  U,S.  oil  conservation  are reflected
in the estimated  supply  curves  of world  conservation  achieved  through
unilateral U.S.  action.  If  0PEC  supply  is perfectly  inelastic, the OMS  model
shows  that the marginal  cost of reducing  world consumpt.ion  by one  mil'l  ion
bamels  per  day  through  unjlateral  U.S.  action  would  be  more  than  $85  per
barrel  .
As Figure  6 shows,  even  with the common  assumption  that 0pEC  supply  is
perfectly inelastic, the models  provide  widely  varying  estimates  of the
marginal  costs  of achieving  world  oil  conservation  through  unilateral U.S,
actions.  At one  extreme,  the CERI  model  shows  the marginal  cost of reducing
world  oil  consumption  by a half a million barrels  per  day  would  be  more  than
$100  per barrel  .  In contrast,  the FRB-Dallas  model  shows  the marginal  cost oft7
reducing  world  oil consumption  by  three  rnillion  barrels  per  day  to be  just
over $90  ott  ottttt' 
u.  c'sT EsrItATEs  RE.''{'IDERED
The  analysis  presented  here  assumes  that oil  conservation  can  only be
obtained  by getting  consuners  to adopt  techniques  that they  would  find more
costly  to use  than  oil.  In addition,  it  assumes  that.the  pol  itical process
will select  the  least  costly  methods  for achieving  oil conservation  without
incurring  any  costs  for rent-seeking  behavior.  To  the extent  that these
assumptions  are  not conect, our cost  estimates  may  be  too high  or too low.
A.  Enq  i  neeri  nq-Cost  Studies
Some  analysts,  including  the National  Academy  of Science  Synthesis  panel
on  the Pol  icy Implications  of Greenhouse  Warm,ing  (1991),  have  used
engineering-cost  studies to argue  that supplies  of conserved  energy  are
available  at a net savings  of cost  to consumers.  To  the extent  that
engineering-cost  studies correctly represent  the cost of energy  conservation,
the cost estimates  presented  here  would  be  too high.
l'larket  -  ori  ented  economjsts  find this  line of argument  troublesorne.  In
the absence  of identifiable market  imperfections  or impiicit life-style
changes,  the argument  requires  that individuals  behave  inefficiently by
overlooking  energy  conservation  options  that would  reduce  costs.  Among  other
factors, third-party  purchases  and  the lack of information  have  been
identified as possible  imperfections  in the energy  market. Nonetheless,
Cavallo  and  Sutherland  (1993)  have  found  that energy  markets  are no slower  in
adopting  cost-saving  technology  than other markets,  trhich  suggests  that
suppl  ies of conserved  energy  at a net savings  of cost may  be illusory.
B.  The  Pol  i ti cal Process18
An  analysis  of the po1  itical  process  through  which  oil  conservatjon  would
be achieved  suggests  our cost estimates  might  represent  lo$rer  bounds. To the
extent  that U.S.  conservation  pol  icy alters free market  decisions  and  prices,
it  creates  opportunities  for rent-seeking  behavior. Among  others,  Tullock
(1967,  1980)  has  argued  that jndividuals  who  seek  a rent have  an incentive  to
expend  real resources  up to the value  of the rent.  In doing  so, they
dissipate  the rent as  costs.
The  reduced  cost of U.S. oil  imports  can  be viewed  as a rent created  by
U,S.  oil  conservation  po1  icy,  Accordingly,  rent-seeking  behavjor  could
generate  costs as high as the benefit obtained  by reducing  the cost of ojl
imports. In our exercise,  the marginal  cost  of U.S.  conservation  wouid  rise
up to the amount  by which  a marg'ina1  jncrease  in U,S. conservation  reduces
import  costs.
The  use  of instruments  other  than  an  oil  consumption  tax to achieve  oil
conservation  could  also  contribute  to the cost  of conservation.  Legislation
aimed  at specific oil  conservation  technologies,  would  create  rents for the
producers  of specific technologies  and  give  rise to further costs.  In
addition, Brown  (1982)  has  shown  that past  attempts  to legislate specific
conservation  technologies  have  been  inefficient.  The  marginal  cost per unit
of energy  saved  varied  considerably  across  the legislated  technologies.  The
legislation also ignored  many  Iow-cost  methods  of conservation.
vI.  c0t{clusloils
The  preceding  analysis  allows  us  to reach  three  conclusions.  First, all
of the models  show  that the first  one  million barrels  of U.S.  oil  conservation
can  be  obtained  at a marginal  cost  below  $10  (1988  do1  lars) per barrel  .  Some
of the models  show  sharply  rising costs  after that point.  Second,  uncertaintyt9
about  future oil  market  conditions  suggests  that taxation is  preferable  to
government  mandates  for achieving  oil  conservation.  Finally, world  oil
conservatjon  achjeved  through  unilateral  U.S.  actions  cou'ld  prove  costly
because  U.S.  conservation  is  likely to trigger offsetting gains  in non-U.S.
oil  consumDt  i  on.
Because  the models  show  considerable  variation  in the estimated  costs  of
oil  conservation,  the estjmated  cost  of quantity-based  targets, such  as
holding  U.S.  oil  consumption  at 1988  levels, can  range  from  inexpensive  to
quite costly.  In those  cases  where  quantity-based  targets  prove  inexpensive,
the conservation  pol  icy does  not represent  much  of a departure  from  conditions
that would  prevail in an  unregulated  rnarket. If we  take  the variation across
models  to represent  the extent of uncertainty  about  future oil  market
conditions,  our findings  suggest  that conservation  taxes  would  better serve
economic  efficiency than conservation  targets.  l,lith conservation  taxes,
market  forces can  adjust the quantity conservation  such  that the marginal  cost
is  equal  to the tax, even  when  the costs are unknown.
Undertaken  unilaterally, however,  U.S.  oil  conservation  is I  ikely to
reduce  the world  oil  price and  trigger offsetting gajns  in world  oil
consumption.  The  extent  of these  gains  will  depend  on  the responsiveness  of
non-U.S.  oi1 consumption,  0PEC  suppiy  and  non-0PEC  supply  to changes  in price,
as  well as  the extent  of U.S.  conservation.  The  more  responsive  non-U.S.  oil
consumption  is or the less responsive  world  oi1 production  is to changes  in
price, the greater  the gains  in non-U,S.  oil  consumption,
To  the extent  that U.S.  energy  conservation  po1  icy is motivated  by  global
concerns,  unilateral actions  could  prove  quite costly.  Incorporating  market
feedback  effects into the supply  curve  of conservation  generally increases  the20
estimated  cost of conservation.  For  a intermediate  case--one  in which  0PEC
supply  is assumed  to be  unitary  elastic--the  estinated  marginal  cost of
achieving  world conservation  through  uniiateral actjons ranges  from  $8 to $35
(1988  do1  lars) per barrel at a consbrvation  level of two  mill'ion  barrels  per
day.  For  the same  case,  the estimates  are  $23  to $75  (1988  dollars) per
barrel at a conservation  level of three  million barrels  per  day.  For  an
extreme  case--one  in whjch  0PEC  supply  is assumed  to be  perfectly inelastic--
the estimated  cost of conservation  rises much  more  rapidly.2t
APPEI{DIX:  S0lilE  ANALYTICS  0F  U.S.  0IL C0}ISERVATI0I{
l{e  use  a wel  fare  -theoret  i  c approach  to derive  formulas  for the marginal
cost  of oil conservation.  For  the  United  States,  social  welfare  in the  oil
narket  is the  sum  of U.S.  consumer  and  Droducer  suroluses:
(Al)
In the above  equation,  l.l  denotes  the U.S.  welfare  obtained  from  the oil
market,  Qo  the quantity  of oi1 dernanded'in  the United  States,  Po  the U,S.
demand  price (the  marketrs  marginal  valuation  of consumption  excluding
externalitjes) at each  quantity  (Q), Pu  the world  price of oi1, Q,  the
quantity  of U.S.  oil  suppl  jed, and  P,  the U.S.  oi1 supply  price (marginal  cost
of u.S. oil  production  excluding  externalities)  at each  quantity  (Q).
A.  The  Cost  of U.S.  Conservation
If  the marginal  cost  of conservation  is defined  as  the welfare  lost in
the U.S.  oil  market  by reducing  U.S.  oil  consumption  on  the margin,  the
negative  of the first  derivative  of }l  with respect  to Qo  yields the marginal
cost of conservati  on:
MC.=Po-t.#o,  $z't
In the above  equation  MC,  denotes  the marginal  cost of conservation,  Q.  the
quantity of conservation  (where  dQ.  = -dQo)  , and  Q the quantity of U.S. oil
i  mports  .
B.  The  Global Effects of Unilatera'l  Conservation
ao  o"
u  =dPD(a)aa  -P,Qo  +Psas  -dPs(a)aa22
The  net effect of unjlateral U.S.  actjons  on  world  oil  conservation  is simply
the quantity  of U.S.  oil  conservation  minus  the induced  change  in oil
consumption  in the rest of the world.  The  change  in oil  consumption  outside
the United  States  depends  on how  that consumption  is affected by a change  in
the world  oil  price and  how  U.S.  conservation  actions  affect the world  oil
price.  Therefore,  the relationship  between  a unilateral change  in U,S.  ojl
conservatjon  and  the net change  in world  oil  conservation  can  be expressed  as
fol I ows  :
40^,
dP,  [aq*  aQrr]-t
-  =t_  -  _l
dQc I aP,  aP,  J
-  dQor.  dP,
aPH aQc
(A3)
In the above  equation,  Q.,  denotes  world  oil  conservation  and  Qo,  the quantity
of oil  consumption  outside  the United  States.
If  consuners  and  producers  are price takers, the effect of U.S. oil
conservation  on the world oi1 price can  be expressed  as a function of
underlying  demand  and  supply  conditions.
(A4)
In the above  equation  Q* denotes  the quantity  of oi1 supplied  world  wide.8
As is shown  by taking the first  derjvatives of dP*/dQ.  with respect  to
AQDx/aPH  and  dQru/dP*  the greater the response  of non-U.S.  oi1 consumption  or
world  oil  production  is to a given  change  in the world  oi1 price, the smaller
is the impact  of U.S.  ojl  conservation  in reducing  world  oil  prices.  A change
in U.S.  oil  conservation  will  induce  a change  in the world  oi1 price such  that23
the resulting change  in non-U.S.  oi1 consurnption  less the change  in wor'ld  oil
production  just equal  the change  in U.S.  oil  conservation,  The  more
responsive  either non-U.S.  oil  consunption  is or world  oi1 production  is to a
change  in price, the smaller  is the change  in world  oi1 price required  to make
the world  oil  market  adjust  to a change  in U.S.  oil  conservation.
Combining  equations  A3  and  A4, yields an expression  that shows  how  supply
and  demand  conditions  affect the relationship  between  U.S.  oil  conservation
and  net world  oil  conservation.
(A5)
As indicated by the first  derivative of dQ.r,/|Q,  with respect  to 8Q.*/dP*
the more  responsive  world  oil  production  is to a change  in the world  oil
price, the more  effective U.S.  conservation  is in achieving  world
conservation.  Under  these  conditions,  the world  price changes  less and  the
increase  in non-U.S.  consumption  is smaller.
As indicated by the first  derjvative of dQru/dQ.  with respect  to 0Qor/0P,,,
the more  responsive  non-U.S.  consumption  is to a change  in the world  oil
price, the less effective U.S.  conservation  is in achieving  wor'ld
conservation.  Under  these  conditions,  the world  oil  price changes  1ess,  but
given  the greater  responsiveness  of non-U.S.  oi1 consumption  to price, the
snaller change  in price leads  to a greater  change  in non-U,S.  ojl  consumption,
dQce ,  dQo,  ldQo,  dQrr)-t
dQc  dPu  I aPH  aP,  J24
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t.  An alternatjve to the approach  taken  here  is to make  appropriate
adjustments  when  measuring  the benefits.
2.  This  definition of cost assunes  that conservation  is obtained  by getting
consumers  to adopt  techniques  that they find more  costly to use  than oil.
3.  Hoel  (1991)  examines  a case  jn which  one  country,s  unilateral actions  to
reduce  emissions  could  lead  to an  increase  in global  emissions.  This  outcome
depends  on  the country's  unilateral action  weakening  its  bargaining  position
in a global  negotiation  on  emissions.  The  assumption  made  in the present
analysis that U.S. conservation  affects foreign oi'l consumption  only through
world  oil  prices  precludes  such  an  outcome.
4.  In the Gately  model  , demand  elasticities vary  with the direction and
range  of the price change.  Therefore,  the price  elasticity of U.S,  ojl  demand
revealed  by comparing  the rising and  flat  price case  would  not necessarilyrepresent  how  the model  would  respond  to the increases  in the U.S.  oi1 price
cons  idered  here.
5.  Al1 reported  prices  are in 1988  dollars.
6.  When  U.S.  conservation  leaves  the  world  oil  price unchanged,  there is no
difference between  U.S. and  world conservation  nor betlveen  the marginal  cost
of U.S.  conservation  and  the marginal  cost  of world  conservation  achieved
through  a unilateral U.S.  pol  jcy.
7,  The  EMF  study  djd not provide  cost  estimates  for U.S.  oil  conservation.
The  authors  made  the cost estimates  presented  here  with parameters  inferred
from  two scenario  runs  made  vlith the identified models,
8.  Note that  AQDx/aPu  = "DX.(QDX/PH)  and  dQ.u/dP,  = "sr.r.  (Q.*/Pu1  , where  "o* is
the elasticity of non-U.S,  oil demand  and  ".u  is the elasticity of world  oi1
suppl  y  .Table 1
Models in EMF Study
Model  Working Grouo Contact*
EIA:OMS  Mark  Rodekohr, Enerry Information Administration
CERI  Anthony  Reinsch, Canadian Energr Research  Institute
HOMS  William  Hogan, Harvard and Paul Leiby, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
FRB-Dallas  Stephen  P.  A. Brown,  Federal  Reserserve  Bank of Dallas
DFI-CEC  DaIe Nesbitt, Decision Focus,  Inc.
*Organization listed for identification  purposes. Models and results do not necessarily  represent
official views of listed organization.Iable 2





































Note: Price elasticities have been inferred by comparing quantities supplied and demanded in the
EMF  rising and flat price cases.Table  3
U.S. Oil Consumption,  World Oil Price,  U.S.  Demand  Elasticity,  and Implied Tax,2010
U.S.  Oil Consumption
(millions of bbl per day)
1988  2010  Change
L7.6  18.9  1.3
r7.5  20.5  3.0
r7.s  19.9  2.4
17.5  23.5  6.0
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